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Abstract 
Research from Shogan (2007) and Lim (2008) on the executive branch proposes that the American presidency has 
adopted an anti-intellectual approach to leadership, such that there is a concerted rejection of thoughtful political dis-
course from the president. This has been reflected by what appears to be a relative decline in both the linguistic and 
substantive complexity of presidential rhetoric. Shogan’s (2007) work, while focused on examining whether Republi-
cans are more apt to employ anti-intellectual leadership than Democrats, raises an additional topic worthy of empirical 
examination: the potential relationship between anti-intellectual leadership and unilateral action from the president. If 
anti-intellectual leadership is a defiant form of leadership that opts to publicly demonstrate the rejection of external 
expertise, the usage of anti-intellectual rhetoric from the president might be able to predict the usage of unilateral ac-
tion. On the other hand, anti-intellectual rhetoric might be used as a straightforward and quick means to explain unilat-
eral action, such that change in the level of unilateral action can predict the usage of simplistic rhetoric. Unfortunately, 
no one has yet to empirically test whether rhetorical simplicity predicts unilateral action, unilateral action predicts rhetori-
cal simplicity, or there is a multi-directional relationship present. This project makes an initial attempt to remedy this gap 
in the literature. The project contrasts the monthly average simplicity level of the presidential weekly public address with 
the monthly number of executive orders emanating from the executive branch, using information spanning between Feb-
ruary 1993 and May 2015. The initial findings from the vector autoregression and moving average representation analyses 
suggest that prior change in rhetorical simplicity predicts the usage of executive orders, and that an increase in rhetorical 
simplicity helps produce an increase in the number of executive orders offered by the president. 
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1. Introduction 
Presidents use public remarks in an attempt to shape 
the makeup of the country’s policy agenda (Kernell, 
2007). Public remarks from the executive branch have 
the potential to influence the outlook citizens have on 
prominent issue areas (Wood, 2007). When making 
public remarks, presidents and their speechwriters 
make intentional decisions about the style of language 
used that is perceived to be most likely to resonate 
with the public (Tulis, 1987). One stylistic aspect relates 
to the complexity of language used by the president 
(Lim, 2008). In making public remarks that are simplis-
tic in terms of linguistic qualities and substantive 
depth, presidents could be attempting to make mes-
sages from the executive branch more accessible to the 
general public. By simplifying rhetoric though, there is 
the possibility that presidential administrations are us-
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ing anti-intellectual discourse that abhors the “need-
lessly complex processes and products of the intellect,” 
which include activities like theorizing, critical thinking, 
and examination (Lim, 2008, p. 21).  
A president that uses an anti-intellectual style in 
their rhetorical leadership could be attempting, accord-
ing to Shogan (2007), to avoid coming across as elitist. 
Shogan (2007) believes Republicans use anti-
intellectualism as a form of populism. While anti-
intellectual leadership can stem from individual atti-
tudes and personal experiences, Shogan (2007) makes 
clear that anti-intellectual leadership can be a strategic 
choice made by administrations about the leadership 
style that is most likely to resonate with the public (p. 
295). Given this, Shogan believes that all political elites 
can be placed along an intellectual/anti-intellectual 
continuum. This continuum though is dynamic, mean-
ing that the choice to employ anti-intellectual tech-
niques is subject to change. In the words of Shogan 
(2007, p. 296), “it is overly simplistic to think of presi-
dents as either ‘intellectuals’ or ‘anti-intellectuals.’”  
While Shogan’s (2007) discussion is centered on the 
topic of whether Republicans are more likely to adopt 
an anti-intellectual policy discourse than Democrats in 
efforts to avoid the personal image characterization of-
ten associated with intellectuals of being arrogant and 
smug, her work also raises an interesting question 
about whether anti-intellectual techniques are related 
to unilateral action. Although not fully fleshed out, 
Shogan’s discussion raises various interpretations of 
how anti-intellectual policy discourse relates to unilat-
eral action. Shogan (2007, p. 296) initially says anti-
intellectual leadership is a “defiant leadership stance—
a forceful demonstration of independence. Implicitly, 
anti-intellectualism conveys the message that the pres-
ident is in charge and that he answers to no one.” Op-
erating under this view, one might think that an in-
crease in anti-intellectual rhetoric from the president 
will predict an increase in unilateral action from the 
executive branch. The reason is that anti-intellectual 
policy discourse can be a means to signal that the pres-
ident will not engage in a policy debate with others in 
the political environment. The president through their 
rhetoric is making clear that they do not find the need 
to participate in a deliberative exchange, and instead 
will opt for executive independence on a variety of pol-
icy matters. Shogan believes anti-intellectuals will “of-
ten advertise their disparagement” of intellectual life 
(p. 296). One means of doing this is by marginalizing 
policy details and denigrating policy experts in public 
remarks before exerting executive independence 
through unilateral action. 
On the other hand, Shogan’s discussion can also be 
interpreted in a way that would lead to the prediction 
that an increase in specific forms of unilateral action 
from the executive branch results in an increase in rhe-
torical simplicity. Using Shogan’s (2007, p. 296) words, 
if anti-intellectualism “emphasizes simplicity and effi-
ciency, which enables presidents to justify their unilat-
eral actions,” presidents might use simplistic political 
discourse when explaining their previous employment 
of unilateral policy techniques. Presidents, operating 
under this interpretation, are making clear that unilat-
eral actions are decisions that are not derived from a 
thoughtful analytical analysis of incoming information. 
Instead, the usage of unilateral actions under this al-
ternative perspective is rooted in individual instinct, 
and is explained on these terms. Shogan’s write-up of 
the anti-intellectualism and unilateral action connec-
tion can thus be interpreted in different ways regarding 
the direction of causation, which raises the need for 
empirical efforts that attempt to address how these 
concepts might actually relate to each other. 
It is particularly important for scholars to make an 
effort to examine the possible connection between 
these concepts given the prominence of unilateral ac-
tion in the modern American presidency. Unilateral ac-
tions are a variety of administrative tools and policy 
techniques that the president can exercise on their 
own without the cooperation of either the legislative 
or judicial branches of government (Mayer, 2009). 
While there have been prior efforts to predict and de-
scribe the occurrence of unilateral action (Howell, 
2003; Mayer, 2001; Warber, 2006), no work has yet to 
explore rhetorical simplicity as a variable that can in-
fluence, be influenced by, or displays a multi-
directional relationship with the occurrence of unilat-
eral policy action. Since the heightened usage of uni-
lateral actions by presidential administrations elicits 
questions as to the policymaking role of presidents in a 
system of separated powers (Moe & Howell, 1999), it is 
worthwhile to see whether an anti-intellectual rhetori-
cal style has any connection at all to the level of unilat-
eral actions taken by the president. The purpose then 
of this research project is to assess whether there is 
any evidence of a connection between presidential 
rhetorical simplicity and unilateral action. The two al-
ternative research hypotheses that are evaluated as an 
initial empirical attempt at this area of study are as fol-
lows: 
Hypothesis 1: Prior change in the level of presiden-
tial rhetorical simplicity positively predicts an in-
crease in executive orders. 
Hypothesis 2: Prior change in the level of executive 
orders positively predicts an increase in presidential 
rhetorical simplicity. 
2. Research Design 
Anti-intellectualism is defined as a “resentment and 
suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are 
considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly 
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to minimize the value of that life” (Hofstadter, 1963, p. 
7). Presidents can adopt an anti-intellectual communi-
cations strategy that is linguistically simplistic and sub-
stantively simplistic. Lim’s (2008) empirical work com-
pares the Flesch readability formula scores of major 
presidential addresses to linguistically simple texts (e.g. 
television scripts) and linguistically complex texts (e.g. 
academic journal articles). In his work, Lim demon-
strates that linguistically simplified texts use fewer 
words that are indicative of intellectual processing. The 
Flesch readability formula is calculated by the following 
equation that evaluates any single body of text: 
206.835 minus (1.015 times average sentence length) 
minus (84.6 times average syllables per word). A higher 
Flesch readability score suggests a greater level of sim-
plicity.  
The analyses performed by Lim (2008) indicate 
presidential remarks with high Flesch readability scores 
are less likely to use words from the Harvard-IV con-
tent analysis dictionary that suggest the expression of 
things like similarities and differences between con-
cepts, importance and unimportance of concepts, and 
awareness or unawareness of concepts. Based on this, 
linguistically simplified text, as measured by the Flesch 
readability formula, is also an indicator of substantively 
simplified text. As a result of these findings, this cur-
rent project will use the Flesch readability formula to 
assess rhetorical simplicity. The monthly average 
Flesch readability score of the president’s Saturday ad-
dress to the public is assessed.  
The reason for using the Saturday address as an ap-
proximation of presidential rhetorical simplicity levels 
is that it is the only form of presidential remarks to the 
public that are consistently measurable. Other public 
remarks, such as press conference responses, or the 
State of the Union Address, are offered too infrequent-
ly to develop a more time-refined indicator of presi-
dential rhetorical simplicity. Additional types of publicly 
available remarks, such as economic reports or letters 
to legislators, often contain technical procedural lan-
guage that is an inherent part of the presidential office. 
Using the latter type of public remarks would make it 
difficult to assess the natural communication style the 
president prefers to employ with the public at any giv-
en point in time. As a result, the weekly address is the 
form of remarks analyzed in this project. The value of 
the weekly address in gauging the public communica-
tions strategy of the president compelled Hart, Childers 
and Lind (2013) to devote an entire chapter of their 
book on political tone to this form of public remarks. 
Given there has been prominent scholarly literature fo-
cusing on the weekly address when empirically evaluat-
ing political rhetoric, there is no reason to not use this 
form of presidential communication for the sake of this 
project. 
To make an effort at measuring unilateral action 
from the president, the number of executive orders re-
leased from the president directing federal administra-
tive agencies on policy is measured. Executive orders 
are the form of unilateral action studied in this initial 
analysis, given their prominence in terms of academic 
study on unilateral action (Major, 2014; Mayer & Price, 
2002). As Major (2014, p. 6) notes, executive orders 
from the president “are the most systematically docu-
mented form of direct action.” Executive orders also 
are commonly focused on in debates amongst legal 
scholars about the legal merits of unilateral action in 
the executive branch (Branum, 2002; Duncan, 2010). 
Future projects are encouraged to build upon the initial 
findings seen here by assessing the potential connec-
tion between presidential rhetorical simplicity and oth-
er forms of unilateral action that are publicly available 
(i.e. presidential proclamations, presidential memo-
randa, and signing statements), as there is not yet con-
sensus in the scholarship to treat each form of unilat-
eral action as similar enough that they can be 
combined as a total sum. As a result, much like with 
the rhetorical simplicity measure, the indicator of uni-
lateral action used for this project is only an approxi-
mation of the level of unilateral actions offered at any 
given point in time. The monthly dynamics for presi-
dential rhetorical simplicity and executive orders are 
presented in Figure 1. 
Additional variables that might influence the level 
of unilateral actions used by the president in public 
remarks and/or the level of rhetorical simplicity are al-
so accounted for in this project. Variables assessed in 
various models include the monthly change in Gallup’s 
presidential approval measure, the presence of divided 
government, presidential honeymoon periods (the ini-
tial three full months of a president’s first term), and 
presidential election years (January through November 
every presidential election year). Indicators for unique 
presidential administrations that avoid collinearity is-
sues by omitting one administration (Bill Clinton) as a 
separate indicator are also included. Lastly, indicators 
used to measure exogenous prominent events that can 
warrant swift unilateral action from the president 
and/or change in rhetorical simplicity levels are included 
(e.g. terrorist attacks, start of major military conflicts, or 
natural disasters that cause significant damage). 
Since this project is interested in determining the 
extent of the relationship (if any) between variables 
that potentially have a multi-directional relationship, it 
is necessary to use specific time series techniques. The 
first time series approach is vector autoregression, also 
known as VAR. The second time series approach is 
moving average representation, which is abbreviated 
as MAR. 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of presidential rhetorical simplicity and executive orders, 1993–2015. Note: All information used to 
create the measures of rhetorical simplicity and unilateral action come from the electronic holdings of the Public Papers 
of the Presidents hosted by Woolley and Peters (2015). The timeframe analyzed here is February 1993 to May 2015, 
since the weekly address was reinitiated by President Clinton in February 1993. 
The benefit of vector autoregression is that it can 
assess whether prior change in a variable can predict 
current values of another variable, all without imposing 
a theoretical restriction as to which variable is a priori 
exogenous (Enders, 1996). When conducting a vector 
autoregression analysis, all the variables are measured 
in an endogenous variable system. Each variable in this 
endogenous system is regressed on past values of it-
self, as well as any other variable in the endogenous 
system. VAR analysis inherently accounts for history by 
incorporating multiple lags for each variable in the en-
dogenous system. The inclusion of these lags accounts 
for the inertial qualities of variables (Sims, 1980), while 
also accounting for the effects of any variables omitted 
from the analysis (Eshbaugh-Soha & Peake, 2011, p. 
135). In this project, the endogenous system is com-
prised of the presidential rhetorical simplicity variable 
and the executive orders variable.  
In vector autoregression, Granger tests are per-
formed in hypothesis tests evaluating the joint signifi-
cance of coefficients for each variable in each equation 
analyzed through F-tests (Granger, 1969). What this 
means is that Granger causality tests performed in vec-
tor autoregression can tell us whether the prior values 
of one variable can together predict the current values 
of another variable in the system. Such a facet is very 
important, since the current project intends to assess 
whether prior levels of presidential rhetorical simplicity 
can predict the current level of executive orders made, 
whether the prior level of executive orders can predict 
the current level of presidential rhetorical simplicity, or 
a multi-directional relationship exists between the two 
variables. This is all possible because as Enders (1996, 
p. 106) asserts, vector autoregression treats all varia-
bles within the system as being symmetrical, such that 
there is no reference made as to which variable is the 
independent variable in the model, and which variable 
is the dependent variable in the model. It is also possi-
ble using vector autoregression techniques to incorpo-
rate the previously mentioned exogenous control vari-
ables by modeling each exogenous variable as a poten-
tial predictor of current values of any of the two varia-
bles within the endogenous system.  
While vector autoregression is very helpful in trying 
to determine the causal direction of the relationship (if 
any) between variables, Granger causality tests do not 
reveal whether the direction of any causal relationship 
between variables in the endogenous system is posi-
tive or negative in nature. Vector autoregression is also 
not capable of giving precise information about the 
magnitude of the relationship between variables. The 
reason is that coefficient estimates that are given by 
hypothesis tests using the Granger approach are 
plagued by multicollinearity issues due to the incorpo-
ration of multiple lags in the endogenous system. 
Given these issues, moving average representation 
is a useful means in which to assess the polarity and 
magnitude of any relationship in the endogenous sys-
tem. In a moving average representation analysis, a 
simulated shock is induced on each variable in the en-
dogenous system, and the response of each variable to 
this shock is reviewed over an extended period of time 
(Wood, 2009, pp. 171-172). The MAR procedure then 
helps indicate whether a variable will increase or de-
crease in response to a positive shift in another variable 
that is within the endogenous system studied. The mov-
ing average representation procedure also indicates the 
duration of the shift in one variable following the change 
induced on another variable. To make sure an intuitive 
interpretation of the amount of change variables exhibit 
is possible, all variables in the endogenous system are 
standardized. That means each variable is rescaled to 
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
The results of the MAR procedure then will help elabo-
rate how one variable responds over time when another 
variable is increased by one standard deviation. 
Before performing any of these analyses, it is crucial 
to determine whether each variable in the system is sta-
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tionary. Stationary variables are those that have major 
statistical properties (e.g. the mean, variance, etc.) that 
are constant over time. This means stationary variables 
are random/stochastic with respect to time, and do not 
exhibit dynamics that move following some determinis-
tic trend. Given that the two variables studied are sta-
tionary processes (as indicated in the tests for unit roots 
detailed in the Appendix), it is possible to employ stand-
ard VAR and MAR techniques. A combination of two sta-
tionary variables cannot share a common trend across 
time, which would mean the variables cannot be cointe-
grated. As a result, it is possible to proceed with using 
standard VAR and MAR time series techniques. 
3. Research Findings 
The results of the analyses provide initial evidence in 
support of the view that changes in the simplicity of 
presidential rhetoric predict change in the level of a 
major form of unilateral action, executive orders. The 
results also suggest that an increase in presidential rhe-
torical simplicity produces a positive (albeit small) shift 
in the number of executive orders coming from the ex-
ecutive branch. The findings then lend support to the 
proposal of Hypothesis 1, and not Hypothesis 2. Rather 
than anti-intellectual simplistic discourse justifying the 
usage of unilateral actions, which was one possibility 
raised by Shogan (2007), anti-intellectual political dis-
course is a way to “advertise their disparagement” of in-
tellectual life, and use it as a strategic tool to bolster 
their political authority (p. 296). Presidents can be mak-
ing a conscious choice to use simplistic rhetoric, such 
that it is an indicator of the usage of executive orders. 
According to the vector autoregression results, pri-
or presidential rhetorical simplicity significantly pre-
dicts current levels of executive orders (p = 0.06). Past 
presidential rhetorical simplicity levels Granger-cause 
the level of executive orders. Presidential rhetoric, at 
least in this timeframe, predicts the usage of a particu-
lar form of unilateral action. 
While Shogan (2007) does also raise the possibility 
that presidents perform unilateral actions, and then 
explain these actions through simplified discourse, pri-
or change in the level of executive orders does not sig-
nificantly predict the current level of presidential rhe-
torical simplicity (p = 0.21). For the time period 
studied, past usage of executive orders does not 
Granger-cause presidential rhetorical simplicity. There 
is no indication in the analyses that the usage of execu-
tive orders, a prominent form of unilateral action, has a 
clear direct or indirect effect on presidential rhetorical 
simplicity. Though prior change in executive orders 
does not significantly predict presidential rhetorical 
simplicity, prior change in presidential rhetorical sim-
plicity predicts current levels of presidential rhetorical 
simplicity (p = 0.00). This indicates presidential rhetorical 
simplicity can be predicted in part by prior levels of pres-
idential rhetorical simplicity. The results of the entire 
vector autoregression analysis are presented in Table 1. 
In terms of exogenous controls, there is a signifi-
cant negative relationship between the Bush admin-
istration and rhetorical simplicity (suggesting the com-
plexity of foreign affairs and the domestic economy 
during this period shaped presidential rhetoric to be 
less simplistic). There is a positive and significant rela-
tionship between the Obama administration and rhe-
torical simplicity, which could be a reflection of the 
change in circumstances during the Obama administra-
tion, and/or a difference in rhetorical strategy by the 
Obama administration. The occurrence of some promi-
nent events (the Oklahoma City bombing, the Septem-
ber 11th terrorist attacks, and the start of the Second 
Iraq War) increased the current level of presidential 
rhetorical simplicity. Trying to assuage concerns within 
the public about the ramifications of these particular 
events could increase executive branch efforts to talk 
about these events in a straightforward manner. 
Although prior presidential rhetorical simplicity 
does Granger-cause the level of executive orders of-
fered by the president, presidential rhetorical simplici-
ty is not the only variable that helps shape the level of 
executive orders offered by the president. Like presi-
dential rhetorical simplicity, prior executive order lev-
els predict current executive order values (p = 0.06), 
suggesting that the level of executive orders is deter-
mined in part by prior levels of executive orders. In 
terms of the exogenous controls, presidential approval 
exhibits a positive relationship with the level of execu-
tive orders. A positive change in presidential approval 
levels might give an administration the sense that they 
have the political capital with the general public, such 
that they can take unilateral actions without experienc-
ing a significant backlash.  
There is a significant negative relationship between 
the presence of divided government and the amount of 
executive orders offered by the executive branch. When 
there is a difference in party attachment between the 
President and Congress, employing executive orders 
might exacerbate partisan tension, which can potentially 
make presidents more reluctant to use these or other 
forms of unilateral action. Another significant exogenous 
variable is the Barack Obama administration. The signifi-
cant and negative relationship between the Obama ad-
ministration and the number of executive orders is a re-
flection of the relatively lower levels of executive orders 
offered during the Obama administration compared to 
levels seen at times during administrations that preced-
ed President Obama’s. The start of the Second Iraq War 
was also positively associated with the level of executive 
orders. It is the only event measured that exhibits a sta-
tistically significant association with the level of execu-
tive orders. While one might assume that major exoge-
nous events would significantly predict the level of 
executive orders issued from the executive branch, the 
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statistical analyses performed in this project do not offer 
much support for this proposal. 
The moving average representation analysis find-
ings suggest the relationship between presidential rhe-
torical simplicity and the level of executive orders is 
positive. In column one of row two of Figure 2, the dy-
namic response of executive orders to a one standard 
deviation increase to presidential rhetorical simplicity 
is displayed. At the contemporaneous point of the one 
standard deviation shift to presidential rhetorical sim-
plicity, there is a 0.1 standard deviation increase in the 
level of executive orders from the executive branch. 
This increase is significant, as indicated by the 95% con-
fidence interval being bounded away from the stand-
ardized mean of zero. 
The level of executive orders returns to being posi-
tive and significantly away from the standardized mean 
following the first month post-shock to presidential 
rhetorical simplicity. This increase lasts between 
months two and five, until the decay to the standard-
ized mean begins to be clear around month six. For 
several months then, there is a positive and small in-
crease in executive orders following a positive shock to 
presidential rhetorical simplicity. 
Table 1. Granger tests for presidential rhetorical simplicity and executive order endogenous system. 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable p-value [F-statistic] 
Presidential Rhetorical Simplicity  Presidential Rhetorical Simplicity 0.00 [55.4657] 
Executive Orders  0.21 [1.5592] 
Exogenous Controls 
Presidential Approval (ns, p = 0.92) 
Election Year (ns, p = 0.92) 
Divided Government (ns, p = 0.13) 
Honeymoon Period (ns, p = 0.28) 
George W. Bush Administration (-, p = 0.00) 
Barack Obama Administration (+, p = 0.00) 
Waco siege (ns, p = 0.86) 
Oklahoma City Bombing (+, p = 0.01) 
September 11th Attacks (+, p = 0.02) 
War in Afghanistan (ns, p = 0.58) 
Second Iraq War (+, p = 0.01) 
Hurricane Katrina (ns, p = 0.24) 
British Petroleum Oil Spill (ns, p = 0.94) 
Hurricane Sandy (ns, p = 0.24) 
Boston Marathon Bombing (ns, p = 0.75) 
  
Presidential Rhetorical Simplicity  Executive Orders 0.06 [2.8922] 
Executive Orders   0.06 [2.8387] 
Exogenous Controls  
Presidential Approval (+, p = 0.00) 
Election Year (ns, p = 0.96) 
Divided Government (-, p = 0.03) 
Honeymoon Period (ns, p = 0.60) 
George W. Bush Administration (ns, p = 0.88) 
Barack Obama Administration (-, p = 0.00) 
Waco siege (ns, p = 0.82) 
Oklahoma City Bombing (ns, p = 0.14) 
September 11th Attacks (ns, p = 0.53) 
War in Afghanistan (ns, p = 0.58) 
Second Iraq War (+, p = 0.04) 
Hurricane Katrina (ns, p = 0.31) 
British Petroleum Oil Spill (ns, p = 0.31) 
Hurricane Sandy (ns, p = 0.70) 
Boston Marathon Bombing (ns, p = 0.83) 
  
Note: The arrows indicate Granger-causality from the block of coefficients for the independent variable to the depend-
ent variable based on 0.10 significance levels. The p-values are from F-tests for the null hypothesis of no Granger-
causality. The system includes a deterministic constant. The results of the exogenous controls are based on t-test re-
sults using 0.10 significance levels. As seen in presidency research from Eshbaugh-Soha & Peake (2011), Wood (2007), 
and Wood (2009), Granger-causality tests often employ 0.10 significance levels, given the analytical procedure and 
structure of the model being analyzed. A “+” represents a positive significant relationship, a “-” represents a negative 
significant relationship, and “ns” represents not significant. Each of the independent variables in the system includes 
two monthly lags to control for the inertia of the variables. Lag length is selected by Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). VAR estimation with lags performed with information between 04/1993 and 05/2015. 
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Figure 2. Moving average representation impulse responses for endogenous system. Note: Dashed lines represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Column two of row one demonstrates the response 
of presidential rhetorical simplicity to a one standard 
deviation positive shift in executive orders. For no ex-
tended period of time is the level of presidential rhetori-
cal simplicity significantly away from the standardized 
mean of zero. The 95% confidence interval not being 
clearly shifted away from the standardized mean for a 
discernible extended period of time in the MAR analy-
sis reinforces the results seen in the VAR analysis. In 
the vector autoregression analysis, prior change in exec-
utive orders fails to predict current levels in presidential 
rhetorical simplicity. The moving average representation 
analysis shows a positive shift in executive orders does 
not move presidential rhetorical simplicity in a positive 
or negative direction for any clear duration of time.  
It appears that presidents through their rhetoric of-
fer a signal with an increase in simplistic discourse that 
the usage of executive orders, a prominent and contro-
versial unilateral technique, will occur more frequently. 
Shogan (2007, p. 296) implies anti-intellectuals come to 
conclusions based on gut instinct given existing circum-
stances; pervasive anti-intellectual policy discourse 
could potentially be taken as a cue that a president at a 
given point in time believes unilateral action is the most 
effective option in terms of leadership. The increased 
usage of simplistic statements to the public can be a 
possible sign that the president will increasingly adopt 
the position that unilateral policy tools are necessary, 
and will execute the usage of unilateral policy tools. 
Continued study as to whether this result is found with 
not just executive orders, but other forms of unilateral 
policy tools, will help to further substantiate that sim-
plistic rhetorical discourse from the president predicts 
unilateral actions from the executive branch. 
4. Conclusions 
Work on anti-intellectualism in the American presiden-
cy by Shogan (2007), while focused on the matter of 
whether presidents aligned with the Republican Party 
are more apt to adopt an anti-intellectual leadership 
approach than presidents aligned with the Democratic 
Party, also happens to raise an interesting topic worthy 
of empirical assessment. The topic involves the rela-
tionship between anti-intellectual leadership tech-
niques and the usage of unilateral actions. Given this 
topic was not the crux of the article’s discussion or 
theory, any relationship between anti-intellectual 
leadership and the usage of unilateral action is argua-
bly open to interpretation of Shogan’s brief statements 
on this topic. In order to address this topic, the current 
project attempts to assess the relationship between 
presidential rhetorical simplicity (a clear indicator of an 
anti-intellectual leadership approach based on Lim 
(2008) and Shogan’s (2007) important work), and the 
usage of executive orders, a prominent and controver-
sial form of unilateral action.  
The time series analyses demonstrate that prior 
change in presidential rhetorical simplicity levels pre-
dicts change in the level of executive orders from the 
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executive branch. Prior change in the level of executive 
orders does not appear to predict change in presiden-
tial rhetorical simplicity levels. Presidents appear to 
make clear by simplifying their policy rhetoric that an 
increase in executive orders is forthcoming. Anti-
intellectual leadership is rooted in a variety of aspects 
like instincts, moral sensibilities, emotional states, and 
aspects of personal character (Shogan, 2007, p. 295). 
The dynamic nature of some of these aspects makes it 
worthwhile to explore the connection between presi-
dential rhetorical simplicity and executive orders using 
time-refined indicators of each variable. As the very 
first empirical study attempting to assess the relation-
ship between anti-intellectual leadership techniques 
and unilateral action, this project will hopefully serve 
as a contribution to future scholarship by compelling 
others to attempt to validate the causal direction be-
tween the concepts evaluated in the project. Con-
structing a thorough theoretical framework that can 
help explain the findings of this exploratory analysis in 
a way that clarifies why and when a linkage between 
rhetorical simplicity and unilateral action will be ob-
servable can be a significant contribution to the litera-
ture on presidential leadership, political communication, 
and managerial behavior. If anything, this project has 
hopefully served as an impetus for future theory build-
ing and development on establishing an explanatory ba-
sis for why rhetorical simplicity could be a signal suggest-
ing acts of executive independence are forthcoming. 
Future research should also make an effort to em-
ploy various empirical strategies to validate whether 
the positive relationship observed here between rhe-
torical simplicity and unilateral action in the American 
presidency holds. One possibility that immediately 
stands out is to repeat the approach used in this pro-
ject and then examine other forms of unilateral action 
(e.g. signing statements, proclamations, etc.). Whether 
or not the results seen in this study are observed when 
analyzing other forms of unilateral action is a fruitful 
avenue worthy of exploration. If anything, this project 
hopefully will inspire quantitative scholars of the Amer-
ican presidency to evaluate proposals and claims made 
by scholarship that explores the executive branch from 
a more qualitative approach. Scholars of all back-
grounds studying the presidency are better served by 
engaging in an exchange of ideas with everyone else, 
regardless of methodological training and background.  
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Appendix  
Table A1. Tests for the Presence of Unit Root in Endogenous Variables 
Dickey-Fuller Unit Root 
Test for Presidential 
Rhetorical Simplicity 
Series 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root 
Test for Presidential 
Rhetorical Simplicity 
Series 
Dickey-Fuller Unit Root 
Test for Executive Order 
Series 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root 
Test for Executive Order 
Series 
Lag Number: 0 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.45629 
5%(*) -2.87243 
10% -2.57253 
 
t-statistic -6.62001** 
Observations 268 
 
Lag Number: 0 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.456292 
5%(*) -2.872433 
10% -2.572528 
 
t-statistic -6.64495** 
Observations 267 
Lag Number: 0 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.45629 
5%(*) -2.87243 
10% -2.57253 
 
t-statistic -13.2919** 
Observations 268 
Lag Number: 0 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.456292 
5%(*) -2.872433 
10% -2.572528 
 
t-statistic -13.3419** 
Observations 267 
Lag Number: 1 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.45638 
5%(*) -2.87247 
10% -2.57255 
 
t-statistic -4.01272** 
Observations 267 
 
Lag Number: 1 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.456292 
5%(*) -2.872433 
10% -2.572528 
 
t-statistic -5.92868** 
Observations 267 
Lag Number: 1 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.45638 
5%(*) -2.87247 
10% -2.57255 
 
t-statistic -9.44134** 
Observations 267 
Lag Number: 1 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.456292 
5%(*) -2.872433 
10% -2.572528 
 
t-statistic -13.3215** 
Observations 267 
Lag Number: 2 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.45647 
5%(*) -2.87251 
10% -2.57257 
 
t-Statistic -3.39108* 
Observations 266 
 
Lag Number: 2 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.456292 
5%(*) -2.872433 
10% -2.572528 
 
t-statistic -6.02522** 
Observations 267 
Lag Number: 2 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.45647 
5%(*) -2.87251 
10% -2.57257 
 
t-statistic -7.87874** 
Observations 266 
Lag Number: 2 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.456292 
5%(*) -2.872433 
10% -2.572528 
 
t-statistic -13.3776** 
Observations 267 
Lag Number: 3 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.45655 
5%(*) -2.87255 
10% -2.57259 
 
t-statistic -2.88041* 
Observations 265 
Lag Number: 3 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.456292 
5%(*) -2.872433 
10% -2.572528 
 
t-statistic -6.12141** 
Observations 267 
Lag Number: 3 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.45655 
5%(*) -2.87255 
10% -2.57259 
 
t-statistic -7.05507** 
Observations 265 
Lag Number: 3 
Sig. Level Crit. Value 
1%(**) -3.456292 
5%(*) -2.872433 
10% -2.572528 
 
t-statistic -13.4357** 
Observations 267 
Note: Null hypothesis in all unit root tests above is that the analyzed series contains a unit root, while the alternative 
hypothesis is that the analyzed series is produced by a stationary process. 
